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Digital Smartphone Tracking for COVID-19
Public Health and Civil Liberties in Tension
Contact investigations have been a vital public health
strategy, most recently in controlling tuberculosis and
sexually transmitted infections including HIV. Yet, the
sheer scale of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections poses major challenges to contact investigations. Strategies in China,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have supplemented traditional manual approaches with digital surveillance through smartphone applications.
The US has not used digital surveillance as a tool,
but Google, Apple, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), as well as 2 pan-European consortia
and a variety of independent efforts are developing
Bluetooth smartphone technology to enable rapid notification of users that they have had a close exposure
to individuals diagnosed with medically verified coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). How does digital tracking differ from manual tracing? Although digital surveillance has the distinct advantages of scale and speed,
does it confer sufficient public health benefit to justify
adoption given privacy concerns? How do the design
choices of digital contact tracing systems affect public
health and privacy?
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Most thoughtful uses of smartphone technologies augment, but do not replace, manual tracing. The most successful strategies begin by massively scaling up manual
tracing, as Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York have
recently done.1 Automated systems are designed to add
information more rapidly and are scalable to large populations. Traditional tracing begins with reporting to the
health department, which then assesses risk, asks diagnosed patients for their known contacts, and notifies
contacts of potential exposure, all by telephone call or
in person.2 Although patients are not usually obligated
to disclose their contacts, and health officials do not inform contacts of the patient’s name, in some instances
those informed can infer who the index patient is.
By contrast, digital tracing rapidly notifies users if
they have been in close proximity with a person medically diagnosed with COVID-19. By design, these systems will have layers of privacy protection. Digital tracing will detect proximity, not geographic location,
avoiding centralized databases of where smartphone users have traveled. Moreover, downloading and using the
smartphone application is voluntary. As a result of recent collaborative efforts by Apple and Google, individuals with iOS or Android smartphones would have the option to turn on tracing similar to the user option to turn
on or off location services. The technique for determining proximity relies on anonymous signals (called

jama.com

“chirps”) sent back and forth between phones. Chirps
contain no identifying information, safeguarding user privacy. An individual’s COVID-19 diagnosis is not revealed
except to the public health authorities.3
Digital systems could empower users if public health
agencies have oversight of the systems. Apple and Google
plans to authorize use of their applications only if health
authorities approve. Health officials would define medically significant exposure (distance and time), health messages to identified contacts regarding self-isolation, symptom checks, and notification of medical and public health
personnel. The public would have to be assured and trust
that Apple, Google, and public health personnel would
never use the data for any other purpose.

User Controlled vs Centralized Approaches
Twocontrastingapproachestodigitalcontacttracinghave
emerged: a more centralized approach favored by governments in China, South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere
and a decentralized, user-centric approach supported by
the joint Apple-Google system and favored by some, but
not all, European countries (eTable in the Supplement).
China, for example, combined government surveillance
of the location histories for individuals to create infection risk scoring systems, and now requires its citizens to
score “green” to enter public facilities, workplaces, or
travel. South Korea’s digital surveillance uses law enforcement and fines to sanction individuals who violate quarantine or social distancing orders. Taiwan added smartphonelocationtrackingtodetectandsanctionquarantine
violations. Israel initially used national security legal authorityfortheMinistryofHealthtoimplementdigitaltracking,butrecentlytheIsraeliHighCourtofJusticefoundthat
the surveillance, conducted as it was under an executive
order and absent legislative approval, lacked adequate
legal basis to continue.4-6 Importantly, every successful
implementation of digital systems relied also on wellresourced and rapidly deployed manual contact tracing.7
A divide has emerged in Europe over the design of
automated tracing systems. Countries agree that digital systems are needed to automatically identify contacts of infected individuals but disagree about how
much personal information health authorities should receive without individual consent. Some governments
(eg, France, Italy, and the UK) favor more centralization
in which public health departments immediately receive personal information about identified contacts.
Other governments (eg, Austria, Estonia, Germany, and
Switzerland) favor decentralization following a design
from a group of European academics called DT-3P in
which contacts receive notification of their proximity to
infected people, but health authorities are notified only
(Reprinted) JAMA Published online May 27, 2020

© 2020 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Georgetown University Medical Center User on 05/29/2020

E1

Opinion Viewpoint

if the individual chooses to do so. The Apple, Google, and MIT designs are aligned with this decentralized approach. In the US, the federal government has yet to announce a nationwide policy.

Optimal Design: Balancing Health and Privacy
Despite scientific uncertainty, digital systems could significantly contribute to curtailing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection if adopted
widely and integrated into comprehensive public health strategies.
Ultimately, there may be trade-offs between public health efficacy
and privacy-enhancing features.
Digital tracing should augment traditional public health strategies but cannot replace them. Primary public health strategies includewidescalepopulationtesting,manualtracing,isolation,andquarantine. Social distancing also remains important for mitigating spread
and maintaining health system capacities. As important as opening
the economy may be, overreliance on digital tracking alone will result
in a resurgence of cases and increased stress on the hospital system.
Digital systems cannot effectively augment traditional methods
without widespread uptake. A recent simulation suggests the
COVID-19 pandemic can be suppressed with 80% of all smartphone
users utilizing the application, or 56% of the overall population.8 A voluntary system without effective incentives is unlikely to achieve sufficient uptake, although partial benefits could accrue at lower levels
of uptake. Early results from Singapore’s voluntary system have shown
only 20% of the population had installed the application as of April
21, 2020.9 The US public is unlikely to accept mandates to implement digital tracing, even in a health emergency. Maintaining public
trust remains a vital component of COVID-19 pandemic control.
Because a critical mass of users will not be in the network at the
requisite time, and some individuals will not register a COVID-19 diagnosis, digital systems alone cannot ensure safety. Public health officials must educate the public about the deficiencies of voluntary
tracking systems. Otherwise, the public could gain a false sense of

Trade-off Between Civil Liberties and Public Health
Although it is conceivable to envisage public health and civil liberties as synergistic, they often are in tension. To improve uptake,
governments could mandate or incentivize use of these technologies and permit data uses by employers and businesses. State health
departments could also seek access to digital data for wider surveillance purposes. Given the current evidence base behind these digital methods, it would be premature to mandate their use, thus the
trade-off between privacy and autonomy for uncertain public health
benefits. Incentives seem more plausible. Widespread deployment would only be warranted if pilot projects and modeling offer
sufficient scientific evidence to assess public health efficacy against
privacy and other costs.
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